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Purpose. In order to effectively feign post-traumatic stress disorder, a person needs to
confabulate an exposure narrative and to fabricate symptoms of high distress. The
Verifiability Approach (VA) is a lie-detection method based on the notion that truth
tellers’ narratives include more verifiable (checkable) information than liars’ narratives.
The Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI) is a measure of over-reporting, and it includes
genuine symptoms and pseudosymptoms that are likely to be endorsed in fabricated
symptom reports. In this study, we examined whether the VA can help discriminate the
fabricated exposure narratives, and whether the SRSI can aid screening for symptom
over-reporting.
Method. One group of participants (truth tellers) witnessed a vehicle crash scene using
the Virtual Reality paradigm (n = 22), while the other group (feigners) was instructed to
fabricate such an experience (n = 46). All the participants wrote the exposure narratives
and completed the SRSI.
Results. Feigners produced non-verifiable (vague) and lengthier narratives than truth
tellers, who reported a higher proportion of checkable information. Regarding the
symptom reports, feigners endorsed more of trauma-related genuine symptoms and
pseudosymptoms than truth tellers.
Conclusion. The non-verifiable details and the proportion of verifiable details, together
with the SRSI subscales, can assist explaining the reporting strategies of those feigning
negative exposures.
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was officially introduced in 1980 (DSM-3; American
Psychiatric Association, 1980) and pertains to a broad range of psychological disturbances
as a consequence of a trauma experience (Resnick, West, & Payne, 2008). Originally, this
type of diagnosis was associated with war veterans (Adamou & Hale, 2003), but it soon
became clear that combat exposure is not the only possible trigger for PTSD. In fact, any
negative life event can be experienced as traumatic (Resnik et al., 2008), but not every
traumatic experience results in PTSD (Bonanno, 2005; Hall, Hall, & Chapman, 2006).
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in anymedium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.
*Correspondence should be addressed to Irena Boskovic, Forensic Psychology Section, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200
MD Maastricht, The Netherlands (email: irena.boskovic@maastrichtuniversity.nl).
DOI:10.1111/lcrp.12149
1
Prevalence of traumatic exposure in general public is up to 70%, yet the prevalence of
PTSD is approximately 10% (Young, 2016). The highest prevalence of PTSD is among the
victims of sexual abuse (up to 80%;Hall et al., 2006) andwar veterans (up to 58%;Guriel &
Fremouw, 2003), compared with a general population (up to 15%; Hall & Hall, 2007).
As currently described in DSM 5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), the
diagnosis of PTSD includes eight different criteria (A–H). In order to receive the PTSD
diagnosis, a person must have (1) a traumatic experience (A), (2) symptoms that were
caused by the traumatic experience: re-experiencing (B), avoidance (C), negative mood
and cognition (D), and arousal (E), which (3) last at least 1 month (F), present a severe
obstacle for daily functioning (G), and are not a product of medication or alcohol/drug
abuse (H). All of these criteria are based on self-report, meaning that a person can easily
over-report of fully fabricate his/her trauma-related complaints if incentivized to do so
(i.e., malinger). Malingering presents a deliberate fabrication of symptoms in order to
gain potential external benefits (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Indeed, there
are many potential financial (e.g., compensation) and legal (e.g., reduced criminal
responsibility) benefits available for people suffering from PTSD (Knoll & Resnick,
2006; see also Rassin, Boskovic, & Merckelbach, 2018). Thus, due to the self-evident
nature of its key symptoms, incentives surrounding this diagnosis, and professionals
who admit their uncertainty in recognizing malingering (Cohen & Appelbaum, 2016),
PTSD is one of the most easily and the most frequently feigned psychological disorders
(Guriel & Fremouw, 2003; Resnik et al., 2008; Resnick, West, & Wooley, 2018). The
estimated prevalence of fabricated PTSD is above 30% (Freeman, Powell, & Kimbrell,
2008; Lees-Haley, 1997).
In order to successfully feign suffering from PTSD, a person needs to provide a
convincing story about the exposure (A criterion), and to adequately report symptoms (B–
E). Therefore, the detection of such cases must comprise assessment of the validity of the
exposure statements, as well as the validity of reported symptoms.
Verifying exposure narratives
Previous research on verbal credibility assessment suggests that truthful narratives
contain overall more details than deceptive reports (Johnson, 2006), as well as more
specific information, such as time and location (Porter, Peace, & Emmett, 2007).
Furthermore, truthful narratives are more emotionally charged and judged as more
plausible than narratives about a non-actual event (Peace & Porter, 2011). Currently,
there are many methods of credibility assessment that are based on the assumption that
truthful narratives include details of certain quality. For example, the most commonly
used tool, the Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA, Steller & Koehnken, 1989),
includes 19 different criteria organized around five major domains, such as general
characteristics, specific content, specific features of the content, content related to
motivation, and elements of aggression. The presence of each CBCA criteria indicates
truthfulness of the statement (Amado, Arce, Farina, & Vilari~no, 2016). Twometa-analyses
performed on the utility of the CBCA (Amado et al., 2016; Hauch, Sporer, Masip, &
Blandon-Gitlin, 2017) provided overall favourable findings. However, findings of
Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, Broers, and Merckelbach (2013) suggested that the CBCA criteria
are vulnerable to contextual bias (Bogaard et al., 2013). In other words, the
interpretation of the statements and scoring on both CBCA and RM criteria can
considerably change if coders are presented with any additional information, such as
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evaluee’s personality characteristic, which limits the reliability of these methods
(Bogaard et al., 2013).
Alternatively, a recently developed technique, the Verifiability Approach (VA; Nahari,
Vrij, & Fisher, 2014a), has shown some success in facilitating the detection of fabricated
statements (e.g., Harvey, Vrij, Nahari, & Ludwig, 2017; Jupe, Leal, Vrij, & Nahari, 2017;
Nahari, 2018). According to this approach, people who are telling truth include more
details that are verifiable (i.e., checkable in the real world) in their statements than people
who fabricate their accounts. Liars cannot provide verifiable information without the risk
of being caught; therefore, they opt to report more information unavailable for external
validation (i.e., non-verifiable details; Nahari, 2018). For instance, reporting ‘I had coffee
with my friend, Brianna’ would be considered as verifiable due to the inclusion of an
identifiable person that could (in principle) confirm provided information. However, a
person who wants to deceive the interviewer would probably keep the statement vague,
such as ‘I was sitting on a bench alone’ (see also Nahari et al., 2014a).
Furthermore, the statements of truth tellers and liars differ even more when the
statement-givers are informed, using an ‘Information Protocol’, that the number of
reported verifiable details will serve as an indicator of their veracity.While this instruction
elicits more verifiable details from truth tellers, liars are unable to follow through without
exposing their lies, thus their reports remain mostly non-verifiable (Harvey et al., 2017).
This implies that disclosing the detection strategy actually facilitates the success of the VA
(Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014b).
In previous studies (Boskovic, Bogaard, Merckelbach, Vrij, & Hope, 2017; Boskovic,
Gallardo, Vrij, Hope, &Merckelbach, 2018), researchers aimed to test the utility of the VA
outside of its original lie-detection context. They investigated whether the VA is effective
in the context of symptom reporting and if the use of this approach would enhance the
detection of fabricated complaints (i.e., headaches). However, the verifiable details did
not aid the detection of fabricated symptoms complaints because people with genuine
complaints and malingerers reported similar amounts of verifiable information. Rather,
the increased amount of non-verifiable information appeared to be a cue for deceptive
symptom reports. Those who malingered provided notably more non-verifiable details,
also making their reports significantly lengthier when compared with genuine accounts.
However, both of these trademarks, non-verifiable details and length of reports, were lost
once the Information Protocolwas applied. It is likely that providing participantswith the
clear instructions on which type of details would indicate their veracity subsequently
influenced both groups of participants to write similar statements. This finding goes
against presented results from the lie-detection literature.
Although the creators of the VA claim that the utility of this approach is limited in the
context ofmalingering due to the unverifiable status of symptoms (Nahari, 2018),we tend
to disagree with this reasoning. Symptoms, such as pain or headache, usually lead to
behaviours open for verification (e.g., going to the doctor, taking medication etc.;
Boskovic et al., 2018). However, a critical difference between the lie-detection and
malingering contexts might be the feasibility of providing false verifiable details. For
instance, in typical lie-detection contexts, where people report about an external event
likely witnessed by others (e.g., a fight), a production of misleading verifiable information
might be a riskier choice than when a person is describing his/her internal state (e.g.,
pain). Therefore, feigners might have an easier task in providing checkable information
when presented with the Information Protocol (Boskovic et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, in case of malingered PTSD, the contexts of lie detection and
malingering overlap. Hence, although the detection of fabricated exposure narratives
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resembles the lie detection, and therefore, similar methods may apply, the symptom
veracity assessment requires a malingering specific approach.
Symptom endorsement in feigned PTSD
Assessing the veracity of the symptoms using the verbal assessment and content
analysis (e.g., Akehurst et al., 2015) has not been a dominant approach within the
field of symptom validity assessment. Rather, most research focusses on the
development of symptom scales that test for over-reporting and exaggerated
complaints known as the Symptom Validity Tests (SVTs). The ‘over-the-top’ way
of responding to symptoms inventories was shown to be a trademark of fabricated
PTSD reports (e.g., Hall & Hall, 2007; Peace & Masliuk, 2011; Tracy & Rix, 2017).
Thus, the idea behind the SVTs is that those who fabricate their symptoms will
overendorse items on symptom inventories, even if they contain bizarre/implausible
complaints (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003). One such measure is the Structured
Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; Smith & Burger, 1997). The SIMS
includes 75 atypical items, which are not likely to be true even for genuine patients.
For example, items such as ‘Sometimes when writing a phone number, I notice that
the numbers come out backwards even though I don’t mean to do it’. People who
endorse such items above a proposed threshold score (e.g., 16, Smith & Burger,
1997) are believed to be over-reporting, and thus, their reports should be viewed
with some scepticism. Furthermore, recently a study showed that the tendency to
overendorse SIMS items is even more pronounced among people fabricating direct
traumatic exposure than indirect aversive experience (Szogi & Sullivan, 2018).
However, these atypical items are often obvious to the examinees, a shortcoming
that diminishes the reliability of SIMS. Additionally, the SIMS includes items
pertaining to complaints such as amnesia, psychosis, and low intelligence, which
are frequent within the criminal context, but not in civil medico-legal setting
(Merten, Merckelbach, Giger, & Stevens, 2016).
A recently developed measure of over-reporting, the Self-Report Symptom
Inventory (SRSI; Merten et al., 2016), may be a better alternative for two reasons.
First, the SRSI includes a mix of genuine symptoms and pseudosymptom items
divided into two main scales. A typical item for the genuine symptom scale is ‘I
have nightmares about things that happened to me’, while for the pseudosymptom
scale, a typical example is ‘I can’t remember what happened to me, but I constantly
dream about it’. Because both types of items are distributed throughout the
questionnaire, it is more difficult for an examinee to recognize the real aim of the
assessment. Second, the SRSI genuine symptoms scale of symptoms related to (1)
cognitive complaints; (2) depression; (3) pain; (4) somatic problems; and (5)
anxiety/PTSD. Meanwhile, the pseudosymptoms scale taps into (1) cognitive/
memory complaints; (2) neurological motor; (3) neurological sensory issues; (4)
pain; and (5) anxiety/depression/PTSD. Thus, each of the two main (genuine
symptoms and pseudosymptoms) scales includes five subscales describing the most
prevalent complaints within civil medico-legal context (Merten et al., 2016).
Research to date suggests that the SRSI is a promising tool for detection of over-
reporting, with rates of detection above 77% (Merten et al., 2016). However, the
utility of the subscales alone, such as genuine and pseudosymptoms of anxiety-
related issues, has not been examined so far.
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The current research
The aim of this study was to investigate the quality of narratives and symptom reports
between people instructed to fabricate an aversive experience and its consequences and
people who were exposed to an aversive experimental manipulation. In this study, we
included two groups of participants. One group participated in a (separate) study
conducted in the clinical psychology department, inwhich theywere exposed to aVirtual
Reality (VR) scene of a vehicle crash as a method of inducing trauma-like symptoms. The
second group, participating only in the current study, was not exposed to the VR scene of
the vehicle crash, butwas instructed to act as if they hadwitnessed the sameVR scene.We
then asked all participants towrite a narrative about the scene as if they hadwitnessed it in
person.Weanticipated that truth tellerswould reportmoreverifiabledetailswhile feigners
would produce more non-verifiable information. Additionally, we asked participants to
report their distress caused by the witnessed scene by using the anxiety/PTSD-related
subscales of the SRSI. We expected that truth tellers would endorse significantly fewer
symptoms of both the genuine symptoms and pseudosymptoms than feigners.
Method
Sample
We initially recruited 102 participants; 21 participants were subsequently excluded (see
below), and a further 13 participantswithdrew from the study. The final sample consisted
of 67 students (77.6% females, Mean age = 22.5, SD = 3.83). Of this sample, 22 (truth
telling condition) participants were recruited from a separate clinical study focused on
inducing PTSD-like symptoms using the VR paradigm. On average, participants joined the
current study 6 days (SD = 8.00; range 0–25) after the VR exposure. After careful
inspection, oneparticipantwas additionally excludedbecause of the extremely long delay
after the exposure (80 days), which led to a total of 21 truth tellers. The rest of the
participants (n = 46) were a newly collected sample who did not witness the VR scene.
Participants in this second group were instructed to feign the experience of witnessing
the VR scene as if they experienced it 7–15 days ago (feigning condition). Both studies
were approved by the standing ethical committee.
Measures and materials
Jellinek-PTSD Screening Questionnaire (JPSQ, van Dam, Ehring, Vedel, & Emmelkamp, 2013)
Participants in the VR study (truth tellers)were pre-screened for putative PTSD symptoms
using the JPSQ. The JPSQ is a short self-report questionnaire and consists of four questions
that can be answered with either yes or no. The score is the total sum of positive answers
(range 0–4). Only participants with a score of 0were allowed to participate in the current
study. The JPSQ has shown to have high sensitivity (.87) and specificity (.75) (van Dam
et al., 2013).
PTSD checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Weathers et al., 2013)
Participants in the feigning condition were pre-screened for any current high distress
using the PCL-5. To adhere to ethical restrictions, we excluded any participant (n = 21)
who responded with an answer equal to or higher than 3 (Quite a bit). The Cronbach’s
alpha of PCL-5, based on the entire initial feigning sample (N = 80), was .94.
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Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI; Merten et al., 2016)
The SRSI includes 107 items belonging to two superordinate scales: One that pertains to
plausible symptoms and one that pertains to pseudosymptoms. Furthermore, each of the
two main scales includes five subscales tapping into different issues. In this study, we
focused only on the two subscales, pertaining to the symptoms expected to follow an
exposure to an aversive event (i.e., anxiety and PTSD-like symptoms). Thus, we included
22 items, two control items, and 20 items describing the anxiety/PTSD-related
complaints. Half of the items present genuine anxiety/PTSD-like symptoms (Cron-
bach’s alpha = .88), and the other half tap into exaggerated complaints (e.g.,
pseudosymptoms; Cronbach’s alpha = .75). For each symptom, participants indicate
whether or not they suffer from it (False/True); thus, the maximum score per scale
(genuine and pseudosymptoms) is 10. Although these subscales include a mix of
symptoms, among which is also depression, we will address them as ‘anxiety/PTSD
subscales’ for the sake of clarity.
Newspaper article
Beforewitnessing theVR scene, participants in the clinical study (truth tellers)were given
a newspaper article. Modelled on newspaper reports of actual crashes, the article
describes the accident, includes information about the victims, and speculates about
possible causes of the crash. The article included a picture of the crash scene. The article
was 100words in length andwaspresented inbothEnglish andDutch (seeAppendix).We
also incorporated the article into our study design.
Virtual reality scenario
In order to elicit PTSD-like symptoms among the truth tellers group, participants were
exposed to a Virtual Reality scenario depicting a vehicle crash between a car and a
train. The VR simulation was created and run in Unity 5 on an Oculus Rift DK2
(Development Kit 2). The programming language used was C#, and the graphics were
created in Blender 3D. The VR scenario was shot from the first-person perspective, and
a participant could look left and right within the immersive scene. The scene is as
follows: the crash involving a train and a car has already happened. The participant is
on a bike, and in front of her/him, there is a fence and three parked cars. Two people,
a woman and a man, are standing next to their car, panicking and trying to call for
help. The train is not moving, and a fire starts in the car. The victims, a man and a
baby, are loudly screaming from the burning car. No train passengers are visible. The
crossing lights and warning sirens are on, and it is raining. The car is consumed in
flames, and the victims trapped in the car fall silent. In the last minute of the scene,
police and ambulance sirens can be heard approaching.
Procedure
Participants from a separate clinical study served as our truthful comparison group (truth
telling condition). This study was concerned with inducing PTSD-like symptoms.
Exclusion criteriawere a non-zero score on the JPSQ and havingwitnessed or having been
involved in a car crash. For participants in the feigning condition, the exclusion criteria
were a PCL-5 score (equal to or higher than three), and having witnessed or having been
involved in a car crash, but no participants reported having that experience.
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All of the participants in both conditions received aQualtrics link,which allowed them
to access the study program. After responding to demographic questions (age, gender,
and student status), truth tellers were also asked to indicate the delay (in days) since
exposure to the VR scene. Then, all participants were given a battery of self-report
questionnaires1 followed by the twomain tasks: (1) towrite the narrative and (2) to fill out
the SRSI subscales. Prior to writing the narrative, participants in both conditions were
instructed to read the newspaper article. Truth tellers were instructed to report about the
VR scene in as much detail as possible. Participants in the feigning condition received
instructions to feign witnessing the crash scene and were asked to imagine receiving
financial compensation from the train company if they provided a convincing witness
account. Research showed that, besides compensation, revenge is a strong motive for
feigning (Peace & Masliuk, 2011); thus, participants were encouraged to think about any
negative experience they previously had with a national train company. Participants
could opt to write their narratives in either English or in Dutch (see Figure 1). In the truth
telling condition, 14 participants wrote the narratives in Dutch (66%), whereas 13
participants opted for Dutch in malingering group (20%). In order to motivate all the
participants to write detailed narratives, we informed them that participants who
provided detailed accounts would be entered into a prize draw for €20.
Coding using verifiability approach (VA; Nahari & Vrij, 2014)
According to the VA, details (i.e., piece of information) of statements can be coded as
verifiableornon-verifiable. Inthecurrentstudy, foradetail tobecodedasverifiable, ithadto
Figure 1. Study procedure.
1 For the sake of clarity, hereby we will only focus on the narrative and the SRSI findings.
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meet one of the following criteria: (1) to be documented (recorded, or left actual or virtual
trace); (2) was related to occurrences that were carried out together with (an) other
identified person(s) rather than alone orwith a strangerwho could not easily be traced; or
(3) pertained to something that was witnessed by an other identified person(s) (Nahari &
Vrij, 2014). Details that did not fulfil these requirements were labelled as non-verifiable.
Coding was performed by two coders, both blind to the conditions. The primary coder
coded all the statements, while the second coded a randomly selected sample of 20%
(n = 18) of the statements. The details were coded in four different categories2 : (1)
Verifiabledetails fromthenewspapers (VNP; ‘Therewere twovictims, amanandababy’),
(2)Newverifiabledetails (V; ‘Aman and awomanwere calling theambulance’), (3)Non-
verifiable from the newspapers (NNP; ‘Potential cause of the crash was a distracted car
driver’), and (4) New non-verifiable details (NV; ‘I thought I would faint’).
The inter-rater reliabilities between coders were calculated using the intraclass
correlation coefficients (ICC), which indicated a very good agreement for VNP details
(ICC = .88, 95% CI [.69–.96]) and for V details (ICC = .86, 95% CI [.33–.96]), as well as
agreement for the NNV details (ICC = .78, 95% CI [.40–.92]) and excellent agreement for
NV details (ICC = .91, 95% CI [.52–.97]).
Statistical approach
The differences in the narratives’ quality and symptoms reports between truth tellers and
feigners were calculated using the Welch’s t-tests, due to unequal sample size between
groups. For the effect size of our findings, we report Cohen’s d. To further examine
whether the verifiable, non-verifiable details, and the SRSI subscales aid the prediction of
the group membership (truth tellers vs. feigners), we performed the Discriminative
function analyses and calculated the Areas Under the Curve (AUCs).
Results
Exit questions
Participants reported moderate motivation in writing the convincing narratives on a five-
point Likert scale (anchors being: 1 = ‘Not motivated at all’; 5 = ‘Extremely motivated’)
(M = 3.73, SD = 1.10), and reporting symptoms (M = 3.82, SD = .88).3
Narrative reports
Participantsof the feigninggroupprovided significantly longernarrative reports than truth
tellers,Welch’s t(55.77) = 2.03,p = .047,d = 0.49. Looking into the frequencyof the four
categories of details,weobserved that 98.5% reported at least one verifiable detail from the
newspapers,100%reportednewverifiabledetails, only15%reportednon-verifiabledetails
from the newspapers, and 95.5% added new non-verifiable information into their reports.
The feigners and truth tellers differed in the total number of non-verifiable details
(NNP + NV), Welch’s t(51.05) = 2.64, p = .020, Cohen’s d = 0.65, which might be a
2Underlined parts of the statements were coded as one detail. For instance, the specification of thoughts should not be coded as
new details, rather only the indication that a person was thinking something (that did not actually happen) would be coded as one
non-verifiable detail.
3We re-conducted all the main analyses excluding the three participants who reported very low motivation; however, our results
did not significantly differ. Therefore, we retained them in the data.
8 Irena Boskovic et al.
consequence of the difference in the number of new non-verifiable details (NV),Welch’s t
(51.38) = 2.68,p = .010,Cohen’sd = 0.66.Noother significantdifferenceswere found in
the number of other categories (VNP, V, and NNP) of details (see Table 1).
We calculated the proportions of total verifiable information ((V + VNP)/Total
details), verifiable details from the newspapers (VNP/Total details), and the new verifiable
details (V/Total Details), controlling for length of statements. The proportion of total
verifiable details (V + VNP/Total details) was significant, Welch’s t(37.36) = 3.37,
p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.90, with truth tellers having higher proportions of these details
(M = .77, SD = .15) than feigners (M = .64, SD = .14). Looking separately in the two
categories of verifiable information, no significant differences were found. The propor-
tion of the verifiable details from the newspapers (VNP) was not significantly different
between truth tellers (M = .24, SD = .19) and feigners (M = .19, SD = .14), Welch’s
t(30.91) = 1.19, p = .24, Cohen’s d = 0.30. Similarly, the difference in the proportion of
the new verifiable details (V) was not significant, Welch’s t(41.12) = 1.95, p = .057,
Cohen’s d = 0.55,4 although there was a higher proportion of new verifiable details
among the truth tellers (M = .52, SD = .14) than among feigners (M = .44, SD = .15).
We re-analysed the narrative-related characteristics (Length, VNP, V, NNP, NV,
Number of Verifiable details, Proportion of Verifiable details, Total number of Non-





M (SD) Welch’s t-test (df)a Cohen’s d
Narratives
Length 161.09 (111.86) 231.63 (167.10) t(55.77) = 2.03* 0.49
Total of verifiable details 33.81 (19.90) 34.52 (22.80) t(44.10) = .130 0.03
Total of non-verifiable details 11.43 (11.66) 20.50 (15.65) t(51.05) = 2.64* 0.65
Verifiable details from
newspapers (VNP)
8.62 (3.61) 8.20 (3.56) t(38.29) = .45 0.11
New verifiable details (V) 25.19 (18.30) 26.33 (21.25) t(44.75) = .22 0.05
Proportion of total
verifiable details
.77 (.15) .64 (.14) t(37.36) = 3.37** 0.90
Non-verifiable details from
newspapers (NNP)
.24 (.54) .17 (.53) t(38.20) = .45 0.13
New non-verifiable
details (NV)
11.19 (11.54) 20.33 (15.60) t(51.38) = 2.68** 0.66
Symptom reports
SRSI PTSD Genuine 2.81 (2.97) 5.85 (3.23) t(41.91) = 3.77** 0.98
SRSI PTSD Pseudo .71 (1.42) 2.67 (2.18) t(56.95) = 4.39** 1.06
Notes. The proportion of verifiable information was calculated using the next formula: (VNP + V)/
((VNP + V) + (NNP + NV)).
aAll calculations were also performed using a non-parametric, Mann–Whitney U test, and the results did
not differ.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
4 The differences in all three proportions of verifiable details was calculated also using theMann–WhitneyU test, and the results
remained on the similar level of statistical significance.
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verifiable details) using the two-way ANOVA, with Groups (truth tellers vs. feigners) and
Language (Dutch vs. English) as independent variables. Neither the interaction between
Groups and Language, nor the main effect of Language was found to be significant,
k = .917, F(6, 58) = .873, p = .52, k = .943, F(6, 58) = .590, p = .737, respectively.
Symptom reports using the SRSI anxiety/PTSD subscales
Truth tellers reported significantly fewer genuine symptoms (M = 2.81, SD = 2.97) and
pseudosymptoms (M = .71, SD = 1.42), than feigners (genuine symptoms, M = 5.85,
SD = 3.23, and pseudosymptoms,M = 2.67, SD = 2.18). For genuine symptoms,Welch’s
t(41.91) = 3.77, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.98, and Welch’s t(56.95) = 4.39, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 1.06, for pseudosymptoms.
Narratives and symptom reports
In order to investigate the relationship between the features of trauma-related
narratives (the number and proportion of verifiable details and the number of non-
verifiable details) and the quality of symptom reports (endorsement of genuine
symptoms and pseudosymptoms), we calculated the Pearson’s r product–moment
correlation coefficients. For truth tellers, none of the correlations reached
significance (all ps > .05). Additionally, we included the delay after the exposure
(number of days before joining our study) as a variable, but none of the correlations
were significant (all ps > .05), indicating no association between the delay and the
quality of the truth tellers’ accounts. However, among feigners, the non-verifiable
details were significantly related to the endorsement of both genuine symptoms and
pseudosymptoms, Pearson’s r being .32 and .31, respectively (ps < .05). None of
the other correlations were significant (see Table 2).
Diagnostic utility of the (non-)verifiable details and the SRSI subscales
First,weexamined general detection accuracy for eachof themainmeasures (number and
proportions of total verifiable and non-verifiable details, as well as the genuine and
pseudosymptoms), using the Area Under the Curve (AUCs) (see Table 3). All measures,
except the number of verifiable details (AUC = .50, p = .962), detected feigners better
than chance (AUCs > .70).
Table 2. Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the features of fabricated narratives and the symptom
reports among feigners
SRSI Genuine symptoms SRSI Pseudosymptoms
Truth tellers (n = 21)
Verifiable details total .30 .04
Verifiable details proportion .19 .41
Non-verifiable details total .42 .19
Feigners (n = 46)
Verifiable details total .19 .15
Verifiable details proportion .14 .11
Non-verifiable details total .32* .31*
Note. *p < .02.
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Second, we tested the incremental validity of combining these measures: (1) the VA
(proportion of verifiable detail & total number of non-verifiable details), (2) SRSI subscales
(genuine anxiety/PTSD symptoms and pseudosymptoms), and (3) VA and SRSI subscales
combined.We ran threeDiscriminative Analyses to distinguish between the truth tellers
and feigners. The group membership was in all three cases the classifying variable. The
analysis including the VA (the proportion of verifiable details and total non-verifiable
details) yielded significant discriminative function, v2(2) = 10.95, k = .84, p = .004
(canonical correlation = .40). The SRSI subscales also significantly predicted the group
classification of participants, v2(2) = 14.98, k = .79, p = .001 (canonical correla-
tion = .45). Finally, the discriminant function was also significant for the VA and the
SRSI subscales combined, v2(4) = 20.30, k = .72, p = .001 (canonical correla-
tion = .52). The sensitivity, specificity, and the overall accuracy are provided in the
Table 4.
Discussion
In the current research, we examined whether the combination of different detection
strategies helps to expose the report strategies of those who feign PTSD. Specifically, we
tested the Verifiability Approach (VA; Nahari et al., 2014a) in the context of PTSD
exposure narratives, and the utility of the anxiety/PTSD-related subscales of the Self-
Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI; Merten et al., 2016) within symptom validity
assessment.
Our results are as follows: First, participants who were asked to feign the aversive
exposure produced significantly longer narratives than truth tellers did. Earlier studies
also showed that feigners elaborate on their injuries more than truth tellers (Purisch &
Sbordone, 1997). Examination of the narratives’ content revealed that feigners inflated the
length of their reports by overproducing new, non-verifiable details. Hence, they focused
on describing their subjective state during the scene (e.g., ‘I was shocked’) rather than on
external circumstances, as shown in previous symptom-focused studies (e.g., Boskovic
et al., 2017, 2018). This means that, regardless of the origin of experience in question,
feigners overcompensate the lack of truthful information with non-verifiable details.
Importantly, every participant reported at least one detail that was, in principle,
checkable. However, truth tellers’ narratives included more information that was already
available andmore self-generated information thatwas checkable. These results alignwell
with findings regarding verifiability within the lie-detection context in which the
proportion of verifiable information was found to differentiate between truthful and
Table 3. The Area Under the Curve (AUC), significance (p) level, and Confidence Intervals (CI) of
numbers and proportions of verifiable, number of non-verifiable details, and SRSI anxiety/PTSD genuine
and pseudosymptoms
Measures AUC p 95% CI
Verifiable details total .50 .962 .36–.65
Verifiable details proportion .72 .004 .59–85
Non-verifiable details total .70 .008 .57–.84
Non-verifiable details proportion .72 .003 .59–85
SRSI genuine anxiety/PTSD symptoms .74 .001 .62–87
SRSI anxiety/PTSD pseudosymptoms .78 <.001 .66–89
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fabricated accounts (e.g., Harvey et al., 2017). Thus far, the majority of the studies that
inspected the narratives of real-life trauma exposure (e.g., Peace & Porter, 2011; Porter
et al., 2007) did not look into the statements’ verifiability, which would be a good
direction for future investigation of this topic.
Second, looking at the symptom report results, the anticipated response pattern
emerged. Feigners endorsed significantly more symptoms from both genuine-anxiety/
PTSD and pseudo-anxiety/PTSD subscales than truth tellers. This pattern of results fits
well with previous research when using the complete SRSI questionnaire (Merten et al.,
2016), and it confirms the over-generalization strategy feigners exhibit when reporting
about their complaints (Merten, Thies, Schneider, & Stevens, 2009). The inflated
symptoms reports were also previously reported in other studies investigating feigned
victimization claims (e.g., Peace, Porter, & Cook, 2010). Furthermore, we found that
feigners’ symptom over-endorsement was associated with a higher frequency of non-
verifiable details in their narratives. This indicates that both the VA and the SRSI captured
the hyperbolism that is typically found in fabricated accounts.
Third, the proportion of verifiable details, the total amount of non-verifiable details,
and both SRSI subscales were valid predictors of feigning. However, this was not the case
for the number of verifiable details, which might not be as an important feature of
narratives in the symptomvalidity assessment (Boskovic et al., 2017). Furthermore,when
the VAwas included in a discriminative function, the overall accuracy was 79%. Themain
advantage of the VAwas the high true negative rate (specificity),meaning that truth tellers
were correctly identified. In contrast, the SRSI subscales exhibited similar overall accuracy
of 76%, with improved sensitivity at the cost of specificity. Combined, both measures
produced an overall detection accuracy of 76%, with a balanced trade-off in terms of
sensitivity and specificity.
A few methodological issues warrant comment. First, we included a healthy student
sample, some of whom had been induced with trauma-like symptoms using the VR
exposure. The VR paradigm is currently the most sophisticated method for induction of
PTSD symptoms because it provides a more immersive environment than a Trauma Film
paradigm (Dibbets & Schulte-Ostermann, 2015). Still, the VR exposure cannot fully
imitate the real-life exposure; thus, our results have a limited generalizability to actual
PTSD patients. Second, our sample was limited in size, which may have led to
underpowered results. However, the main findings regarding narratives and symptom
reports in two veracity groups correspond well to the results of previous studies in the
field (e.g., Boskovic et al., 2017). Third, because truth tellers were free to join the current
Table 4. Sensitivity (true positive), specificity (true negative), and overall accuracy in classifying
participants to truth tellers and feigners using narrative features and the subscales of the SRSI
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study at any time after the VR exposure, they may have chosen to proceed with our study
once the effect of the exposure had declined. However, in this study, the correlation
analyses indicated that the delay was not associated with the quality of truth tellers’
accounts. Furthermore, all the participants in the truth telling condition were debriefed
about the previous study before joining our study. There was no way of testing whether/
how this influenced their reports, but it is likely that students anticipatedour interest in the
trauma-related symptomatology. Fourth, we did not apply the full version of the SRSI, as
recommended by Merten et al. (2016); thus, a closer examination of detection accuracy
was limited. Therefore, the findings concerning the SRSI subscales should be taken with
caution and further tested using the whole SRSI. Fifth, some of the participants opted to
write their narratives inDutch and others in English. Recent studies showed that language
could be an important confounder in symptomvalidity studies (Nijdam-Jones&Rosenfeld,
2017); thus, the language differences could have had an impact on our findings. However,
theeffectof languageonourdependentvariableswasnot significant.Germane to this is the
findingthat incentives, rather than language,haveasignificant impactontheresponsestyle
in symptomvalidity assessment (vanderHeide&Merckelbach, 2016). Sixth, and related to
theprevious issue,weofferedeveryparticipant theopportunity to enter a lottery towin an
additional financial reward for writing a ‘convincing report’. This might have also
motivated the truth tellers to increase the severity of their symptom reports. Feigners,
besides the financial incentive, were asked to imagine having a chance to revenge to the
train company. Revengewas shown tobe a strongmotivator (Peace&Masliuk, 2011). Yet,
inreality,peopleclaimingPTSDareoftenconfrontedwithasignificantly stronger (financial
oremotional) incentive (positiveornegative),whichcanhaveadifferent influenceontheir
response style (Peace & Masliuk, 2011; Peace & Richards, 2014; Resnick et al., 2008).
Finally, due to the different pre-screening procedures of two groups, we were unable to
compare the symptom reports of truth tellers and feigners prior to our study.
To summarize, non-verifiable and lengthier narratives remain a strong cue to
fabrication of symptoms. Furthermore, an over-endorsement of both genuine and
pseudosymptoms should raise doubt in the truthfulness of the aversive exposure claims.
However, in order to validate our results, future research including the PTSD patients or/
and accounts of the real-life aversive events is necessary.
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